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Thomas	Reid	(1710–96)	was	a	believer	in	God	whose	philosophical	
response	 to	 Hume’s	 philosophical	 scepticisms	 and	 religious	
agnosticism	presents,	or	contains,	reasons	of	a	kind	for	affirming	the-
istic	belief,	as	we’ll	see.	But	what	he	wrote,	and	argued	in	his	lectures,	
was	presented	with	less	of	the	explicit	and	up-front	prominence	given	
to	‘The	question	of	God’	than	that	which	we	see	in	Hume.
Hume	 pursues	 his	 philosophical	 labours	 explicitly	 with	 the	
intention	 of	 establishing	 the	 nature	 and	 proper	 limits	 of	 human	
cognitive	 powers	 and	 so	 de-legitimizing	 what	 he	 mostly	 calls	
‘superstition’.	 Where	 that	 word	 is	 most	 used	 it	 is	 plain	 that	 the	
superstitions	 to	 which	Hume	 is	most	 opposed	 are	 religious,	 or	 are	
pretentious	philosophies	offered	by	some	as	supportive	of	religion.1	
And	Reid	did	not,	as	Hume	did,	publish	works	whose	specific	topic	is	
the	implications	of	his	philosophical	views	for	belief	in	God.	Relatedly,	
as	the	passages	from	Hume	which	have	just	been	referred	to,	as	also	
many	others,	illustrate,	Hume’s	elegant	witty	writing	does	not	obscure	
a	 spirit	 which	 in	 the	 opposing	 cause	 might	 be	 called	 evangelistic.	
‘Superstition’,	‘absurdity’,	‘sophistry’	and	‘illusion’	are	strong	words	
whose	hearers	or	readers	will,	if	they	are	believers	in	God,	feel	got	at	
every	bit	as	much	as	a	sinner	being	harangued	in	the	church.	Hume’s	
much	touted	(by	his	admirers)	equable	tolerant	geniality	of	disposition	
has	 to	be	set	against	 such	writings	as	 these,	as	also	e.g.	his	written	
remark	to	his	publisher	about	‘that	bigoted	silly	fellow	Beattie’.	Not	
that	his	dispositions,	genial,	edgy,	or	tetchy,	have	any	bearing	on	the	
soundness	or	otherwise	of	his	argument	or	his	philosophy.	Still	it	too	
often	gets	mentioned	as	if	it	might,	or	as	if	liking	Hume	might	incline	
us	to	like	what	he	says,	as	in	‘love	me,	love	my	dog’.	Compare	Reid,	
who	in	his	use	of	humour	and	ridicule	seems	altogether	more	laid	back,	
and,	which	is	my	present	point,	whose	interest	in	religious	convictions	
comes	out,	less	than	in	Hume,	as	the	motivating	or	focal	concern.	As	
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a	consequence,	if	we	are	to	see	Reid’s	reasons	for	believing	in	God,	
we	have	to	grasp	the	core	points	of	his	philosophical	system	and	its	
central	arguments	and	affirmations.
What	 Reid	 published,	 even	 when	 he	 comments	 on	 the	 longer	
history	of	philosophical	work,	is	with	a	view	to	responding	to	Hume.	
So	we	need	to	remind	ourselves	about	Hume’s	reasonings.	In	his	first	
publication,	 the	Treatise of Human Nature	 (1738),	Hume	confesses	
that	he	experiences	troubling	despair.	We’ll	look	at:	(i)	Hume’s	reasons	
for	despair,	and	then	his	own	remedy	for	his	condition,	and	then	his	
direction	of	travel	from	that	despair;	(ii)	Reid’s	ways	of	avoiding	or,	
as	necessary,	dealing	with	the	problems	which	led	to	Hume’s	gloomy	
plight	and	their	implications	for	belief	in	God.	Prompted	by	this	we	can	
reflect	a	little	on	possible	differing	ways	of	engaging	in	apologetics.
Hume’s despair
Hume	has	shown,	he	says,	that	
[…]	 the	understanding,	when	 it	 acts	 alone,	 and	according	 to	
its	most	general	principles,	entirely	subverts	itself,	and	leaves	
not	the	lowest	degree	of	evidence	in	any	proposition,	either	in	
philosophy	or	common	life.	We	save	ourselves	from	this	total	
scepticism	only	by	means	of	that	[…]	property	of	the	fancy,	by	
which	we	enter	with	difficulty	into	remote	views	of	things,	and	
are	not	able	to	accompany	them	with	so	sensible	an	impression,	
as	we	do	those,	which	are	more	easy	and	natural.2
	 –	 i.e.	 abstract	 arguments,	 ‘remote	 views	 of	 things’,	 notably	
considerations	of	a	profoundly	philosophical	sort.	The	conclusions	of	
such	reflection	do	not	have	such	an	impact	on	us	as	to	make	us	actually	
set	 aside	 ‘easy	 and	 natural’	 concerns	 which	 avoid	 reference	 to	 the	
abstruse.	But	while	we	can	and	do	find	attention	commonly	diverted	
from	abstruse	anxieties	by	the	everyday,	we’re	bound	to	have	–	and	
quite	properly	bound	to	have	–	something	like	a	troubled	conscience	
about	it;	this	particularly	because	the	undealt-with	theoretical	issues	
raise	seemingly	unanswerable	questions	about	 the	presumed	nature,	
and	even	the	very	existence,	of	the	everyday	world.
page 37
In	this	most	autobiographical	portion	of	his	philosophical	writings	
he	 seems	 to	 be	 trying	 to	find	 a	 third	way	between	 the	mind	of	 the	
ordinary	 person	 in	 the	 street	 with	 her	 everyday	 beliefs,	 concerns	
and	 pleasures,	 and	 that	 of	 the	 rigorous	 rather	 sceptical	 philosopher	
who	 has	 exposed	 clear	 error	 and	 groundlessness	 in	 all	 or	much	 of	
the	 ordinary	 person’s	 less	 reflective	 take	 on	 the	 world.	 He	 wishes	
to	 avoid	 mere	 mental	 oscillation	 according	 to	 circumstance	 or	 the	
mood	between	these	 two	(logically	 incompatible)	ways	of	 thinking,	
and	being.	Because	 it’s	 impossible	 to	 live	out	one’s	 life	 in	practice	
in	a	way	that	is	consistent	with	being	the	sceptical	philosopher	of	the	
understanding,	 the	 stance	 or	 the	 path	 of	 the	 ordinary	 person	 in	 the	
street	seems,	practically	speaking,	the	only	option.	But	Hume	insists	
that	that	really	won’t	do.	For	one	thing,	it’s	‘almost	impossible	for	the	
mind	of	man	to	rest,	like	those	of	beasts,	in	that	narrow	circle	of	the	
objects,	which	are	the	subject	of	daily	conversation	and	action’.3	For	
another,	if	we	could	rest	there	in	the	narrow	circle	of	the	matters	of	
everyday	concern	to	us	all,	and	according	to	some	principle	exclude	
reflection	of	that	more	troubling	sceptical	kind	which	undermines	the	
very	credentials	of	our	understanding,	 that	principle	would	exclude	
science	 and	 all	 philosophy.	 For	 yet	 another,	 in	 our	 reading	 and	
experience	we	meet	disputes	about	morality,	 the	principles	of	good	
government,	 what’s	 reasonable	 and	 what’s	 folly,	 what’s	 worthy	 of	
belief	and	what	isn’t;	and	Hume,	for	his	part,	is	‘uneasy’	to	think,	for	
example,	that	he	decides	‘concerning	truth	and	falsehood,	reason	and	
folly,	without	knowing	upon	what	principles	I	proceed’.4	He	desires,	
in	facing	up	to	his	dilemma,	to	help	in	the	better	resolution	of	such	
disputes.	(Though	he	finds	no	fault	in	those,	like	the	English	country	
gentleman,	 to	 whom	 philosophical	 issues	 do	 not	 occur.)	 Human	
beings	do	often	feel	the	need	of	guidance	and	it	is	not	good	for	them	
to	be	led	by	superstition	and	better	that	they	should	turn	to	some	sort	
of	modest	philosophy	–	modest	in	comparison	with	the	unconstrained,	
unprincipled	excesses	of	superstition.
One	problem	with	all	this	is:	on	what	principle	does	Hume	think	he	
can	exclude	the	seriously	worrisome	critical	aspects	of	his	philosophy	
that	have	reduced	him	to	black	despair	while	 retaining	a	beneficent	
fumigating	scepticism	which	will	free	us	from	the	extravagances	of	
‘superstition’	and	the	like?	The	principle	seems	so	far	to	be	little	more	
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than	that	our	ordinary	natural	beliefs	about	the	world	should	not	be	
too	much	disturbed,	nor	the	even	tenor	of	our	minds	scandalized	by	
deep	anxieties.	Surely,	though,	whether	the	conclusion	of	a	course	of	
reflection	or	reasoning	is	found	troubling	or	not	is	not	a	good	ground	
for	demarcating	the	good	philosophy	from	the	bad.	A	proper	criterion	
for	good	philosophy	will	differentiate	between	what	reliably	leads	us	
to	 truth,	and	what	does	not.	Whether	our	conclusions	 then	 leave	us	
calm	or	troubled	is	irrelevant	to	their	value	as	philosophy.
Recently,	in	the	sports	pages	of	The Times of	16th	November	2011,	
I	 read	an	allusion	 to	Hume’s	 angst.	Matthew	Syed	 is	writing	about	
sportspeople	who	have	been	troubled	people,	even	suicidal.	He	thinks	
that	 an	obsessive	perfectionism	 is	 the	 reason,	 and	 that	 if	 one	has	 a	
‘hinterland’	one	can	relax	into	and	in	it.	He	writes,	
‘Sport	has	to	be	the	most	important	thing	in	the	world	if	you	are	
going	to	be	the	best’,	Martina	Navratilova	once	told	me,	‘But	
it	 also,	 at	 times,	 has	 to	 be	 the	 least	 important	 thing.’	Hume,	
the	 great	British	 [sic]	 philosopher,	made	 the	 same	 point.	As	
a	thinker	he	reached	some	dark	conclusions	about	the	human	
condition,	but	(unlike,	say,	Beckett	or	Nietzsche)	never	allowed	
them	to	affect	his	daily	 life.	 Instead	he	forgot	about	 them.	‘I	
dine,	 I	play	a	game	of	backgammon	and	am	merry	with	my	
friends;	and	when,	after	 three	or	 four	hours	of	amusement,	 I	
return	to	my	philosophical	speculations,	they	appear	so	cold,	
and	strained,	and	ridiculous,	that	I	cannot	find	in	my	heart	to	
enter	into	them	any	further.’5		
However,	 the	problem	for	Hume	is	not	 that	he	 is	obsessional	about	
being	as	good	a	philosopher	as	he,	or	anyone,	can	be.	The	problem	is	
that	if	philosophical	reasoning	compellingly	leads	us	to	conclude	that	
we	can	know	very	little	even,	or	especially,	about	things	fundamental	
to	our	conception	of	our	situation	and	nature,	and	about	many	things	
we	had	thought	were	obviously	true,	we	cannot	just	turn	away	from	
that	 to	 diversions	 because	 that	 is	 too	 unsettling	 or	 uncomfortable	
for	 us.	 If	 the	 mood	 of	 anxiety	 or	 despair	 is	 alone	 the	 problem,	 a	
psychological	 solution	 (distracting	 social	 life	 and	 good	 food)	 may	
serve.	Hume	is	no	doubt	sensible	to	leave	off	for	a	bit	from	reckoning	
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with	 these	conclusions	and	grappling	with	 them,	 leaving	off	so	 that	
he	doesn’t	become	too	despairing,	losing	his	wits	even.	But	what	if	
it	only	makes	defensible	sense	to	carry	on	our	ordinary,	as	it	seems	
not	 specially	philosophical,	 lives	at	 all	 if	we	can	deal	with	and	 see	
off	those	philosophical	worries,	defeat	the	reasoning	which	concludes	
that	what	we	take	to	be	the	ordinary	world	of	common	experience	isn’t	
at	all	what	it	seems	–	maybe	even	isn’t	at	all,	doesn’t	exist.	Surely	we	
cannot	just	 leave	them,	stop	worrying	about	them	and	turn	to	enjoy	
ordinary	life.	Turning	to	engage	in	and	enjoy	ordinary	life	is	hardly	
possible	with	intellectual	integrity	when	we	have	it	on	the	authority	
of	 philosophical	 reason	 that	 we	 have	 no	 justification	 for	 thinking	
that	there	are	physical	objects,	that	we	are	persisting	selves,	and	that	
these	are	other	sentient	selves.	These	were	conclusions,	with	others	
as	troubling,	to	which	Hume	has	come	and	to	which	he	has	to	come	
to	terms.
Let’s	now	see	how	he	came	to	the	(to	him)	most	troubling	features	
of	his	view	of	our	situation.	Hume	begins	by	talking	of	the	contents	
of	 our	 awareness:	 our	 ‘perceptions’,	 as	 he	 calls	 them	 (meaning	 to	
include	not	only	the	experiences	we	associate	with	the	eyes,	but	those	
which	we	attribute	to	other	senses,	and	also	with	the	eye	of	the	mind:	
reveries,	dreams	and	so	on),	and	our	impressions	or	ideas.	These	are	
our	 subjective	 awarenesses;	 they	 exist	 insofar	 as	 we	 have	 them	 in	
consciousness.	And	it	is	these,	and	only	these	which	we	are	immediately	
aware	of.	Impressions	or	ideas,	then,	are	the	contents	of	our	conscious	
minds,	 the	 immediate	 content	 of	 consciousness.	Whether	 our	 ideas	
do	or	do	not	provide	a	link	to	a	world	beyond	the	mind,	we	can	still	
consider	and	contemplate	them.	Further	we	can	recognise	properties	
of	the	ideas	and	relations,	resemblances	or	differences	between	these	
ideas.	The	thought-model	is	a	sort	of	inner	perception	–	the	eye	of	the	
mind	–	by	which	we	are	aware	of	ideas.	By	introspection	we	are	aware	
of	ideas,	while	reason,	more	than	mere	awareness	of	ideas,	recognises,	
intuits	properties	of	ideas	and	relations	between	ideas.	Intuition	gives	
us	 to	see/notice/recognise	properties	and	 to	grasp	 relations	between	
them,	logical	and	non-logical	relations.
Hume,	then,	follows	a	lead	given	by	Locke	and	Berkeley	in	holding	
that	we	can	 legitimately	claim	 to	know	only	what	we	can	establish	
by	 the	use	of	 introspection	and	 intuition	(i.e.,	by	 inferring	from	the	
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contents	of	our	awareness):	impressions	and	ideas.	There	may	be	any	
number	of	further	deductive,	inferential,	steps	deriving	from	the	basic	
scrutiny	of	ideas;	and	knowledge	will	be	built	on	ideas	and	reason’s	
scrutiny	 of	 them.	Thus,	 for	Hume,	 knowledge,	 like	 an	 edifice,	will	
have	 to	 rest	on,	depend	on,	 the	 results	of	our	scrutiny	of	our	 ideas.	
The	foundational	propositions	for	the	structure	of	knowledge	express	
truths	about	the	ideas	we	are	aware	of,	truths	recognized	by	reason	as	
it	contemplates	these	ideas.
Locke	 and	 Berkeley	 also	 thought	 this	 way,	 as	 remarked.	 One	
big	attraction	of	 it	 is	 its	seeming	to	secure	certainty	for	knowledge.	
Whether,	in	order	to	know	you	do	have	to	be	certain	is	a	moot	point;	
indeed	I	think	that	what	certainty	is	is	open	to	discussion.	But	it	has	
seemed	clear	to	many	that	what	we’re	aware	of	introspectively	in	our	
conscious	awareness	is	something	we	can	be	certain	of.	Suppose	we	
have	before	our	minds,	whether	by	conjuring	up	the	idea	or	receiving	
it	 somehow	what	 seems	 to	us	a	yellowish	patch	or	object.	We	may	
not	know	exactly	what	 to	call	 it:	gamboge,	ochre,	or	what.	But	we	
know	how	 it	 seems	 to	us,	 even	 if	we	are	not	good	at	describing	 it,	
and	that	must	be	how	it	does	seem	to	us.	So	there	is	certainty	there.	
And	if	by	introspection	and/or	reason	we	recognise	that	it	is	coloured	
and	extended,	or	that	it	has	a	weight	if	it	is	an	object,	these	sorts	of	
judgements	seem	certain,	certainly	 true.	This	sort	of	foundationalist	
approach	 (‘classical	modern	 foundationalist’	 in	 the	 jargon)	 requires	
that	our	knowledge,	the	structure	of	knowledge	rests	on	our	grasp	–	by	
reason	scrutinizing	the	ideas	we’ve	received	–	of	basic	propositions.	
These	are	propositions	whose	truth	we	see	by	the	eye	of	reason	as	we	
are	aware	of	our	given	ideas.	Hume’s	angst	overcomes	him	because	
so	little	can	in	fact	be	established	as	certain	knowledge	by	this	means.	
His	worry	extends	over	a	huge	range	of	areas	where	we	just	take	it	that	
we	have	knowledge.	We’ll	consider	some	obvious	cases.
There’s	 our	 knowledge	 (as	 we	 suppose	 it	 to	 be)	 of	 a	 world	 of	
physical	objects	which	exist,	we	suppose,	quite	independently	of	our	
minds’	awareness	of	them:	tables	and	chairs,	apples	and	planets,	our	
own	 bodies,	 and	 so	 forth.	 These	 sorts	 of	 things	 constitute	 what	 in	
this	context	is	called	‘the	external	world’.	But,	now,	if	all	that	we’re	
directly	aware	of	are	ideas,	mind-dependent	mental	entities,	how	can	
we	gain	access	 to,	knowledge	of,	 this	alleged	world	of	 independent	
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things,	 the	external	world?	According	to	 the	accounts	of	Locke	and	
especially	Hume,	we	seem	to	be	on	one	side	of,	and	viewing,	a	passing	
show	of	ideas,	but	we	are	never	able	to	access	whatever,	if	anything,	
might	lie	on	the	other	side	of	what	is	in	effect	a	barrier	of	ideas.	On	
this	construction	of	our	situation	we	cannot	get	at	an	external	world,	
if	indeed	there	is	one.
Berkeley	 thought	 that	we	 don’t	 get	 at	 it,	 because	 actually	 there	
isn’t	an	external	world,	and	that	we	know	only	ideas;	what	we	think	of	
as	physical	objects	are	ideas	which	are	given	to	us	structured	in	certain	
sorts	of	consistent	ways	by	God.	God	gives	us	these	ideas	ordered	so	
that	 they	constitute	for	us	 the	world	we	experience.	No	need	for	an	
‘external	world’	on	that	view.
Hume	 cannot	 follow	Berkeley	 because,	 for	 one	 (big)	 thing,	we	
can’t	on	the	basis	of	the	ideas	we	experience	grasp	a	concept	of	a	self	
or	mind,	nor,	 therefore	affirm	the	existence	of	continuing	persisting	
selves	or	minds	–	our	mind,	other	minds	or	God’s	mind.	When	we	
look	into	our	idea	stock	we	find	ideas	of	heat	or	cold,	light	or	shade,	
pain	or	pleasure,	but	no	such	idea	as	that	of	a	self	nor	our	own	self.	
There	 are	 bundles	 of	 ideas,	 ideas	 of	 all	 sorts;	 the	member	 ideas	 of	
these	bundles	change	as	time	passes.	So	such	bundles	do	not	constitute	
any	persisting	mind	or	self.	Since	we	must	have	an	idea	(in	Hume’s	
sense)	of	anything	about	which	we	can	meaningfully	speak,	belief	in	
personal	identity	lacks	rational	basis.
More:	If	the	accessibility	of	any	objects	in	the	supposed	external	
world	‘out	there’	at	present	is	deeply	problematic,	how	much	more	so	
is	the	accessibility	of	an	external	world,	or	anything,	in	the	past?	Its	
pastness	adds	another	barrier	between	us	and	it	as	distinct	from	and	
in	addition	to	its	being	external:	Hume	cannot	see	how	to	distinguish	
ideas	of	the	past	and	those	of	the	present	experience	except	in	respect	
of	‘force	and	vivacity’.	And	that	surely	does	not	give	us	a	reliable	basis	
for	distinguishing	remembered	ideas	from	imagined	ideas,	which	on	
Hume’s	view	also	lack	force	and	vivacity	as	compared	with	ideas	of	
the	actual.
Then,	causation	is	an	important	conception	for	our	understanding	
of	 how	 the	 world	 works.	 A	 great	 proportion	 of	 human	 effort	 to	
understand	 the	 world	 is	 devoted	 to	 our	 identifying	 the	 causes	 of	
things	or	events.	Science	of	one	sort	or	another	is	into	causes.	Hume	
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finds	 this,	 too,	 deeply	problematic.	We	don’t	 have	 any	basis	 in	our	
experience	of	A	and	B	when	we	say	that	A	caused	B:	there	is	nothing	
experienced	when	B	follows	A	in	addition	to	the	sequence	of	A,	then	
B	–	nothing	to	justify	our	saying	A	caused	B.	And	it	is	not	a	logical	
connection	which,	if	it	were	so,	might	be	grasped	by	intuition.	There	is	
no	reason,	then,	to	attribute	a	causal	link	between	events.	Attributing	
causal	links	is,	thus,	problematic.
Surveying	the	wreckage	of	what	we	thought	to	be	the	edifice	of	our	
knowledge,	Hume	despairs:	
The	 intense	 view	 of	 these	 manifold	 contradictions	 and	
imperfections	 in	 human	 reason	 has	 so	 wrought	 upon	 me,	
and	heated	my	brain,	 that	 I	 am	ready	 to	 reject	all	belief	and	
reasoning,	and	can	look	upon	no	opinion	even	as	more	probable	
or	 likely	 than	 another.	 Where	 am	 I,	 or	 what?	 From	 what	
causes	do	I	derive	my	existence,	and	to	what	condition	shall	
I	 return?	Whose	 favour	 shall	 I	 court,	 and	whose	 anger	must	
I	dread?	What	beings	surround	me?	and	on	whom	have	I	any	
influence,	or	who	have	any	influence	on	me?	I	am	confounded	
with	all	these	questions,	and	begin	to	fancy	myself	in	the	most	
deplorable	 condition	 imaginable,	 inviron’d	 with	 the	 deepest	
darkness,	and	utterly	depriv’d	of	the	use	of	every	member	and	
faculty.6
When	 he	 manages	 to	 put	 this	 mood	 of	 hopelessness	 behind,	 he	
returns,	 the	 wings	 of	 intellectual	 pretension	 clipped,	 to	 consider	
the	 operations	 of	 human	 minds;	 he	 is	 aiming	 to	 construct	 a	 third	
way	between	overconfidence	about	our	cognitive	powers	(which	he	
has	now	exposed	and	demolished)	 and	black	hopelessness.	He	will	
describe	how	our	minds	actually	work	as	we	acquire	the	beliefs	that	
we	 do	 form	 and	 adopt.	He	 believes	 that	 by	 accurate	 description	 of	
the	workings	of	the	mind	we	can	still	discover	what	the	proper	limits	
of	our	understanding	are,	so	as	 to	avoid	overreaching,	and	 to	avoid	
superstition.	With	a	modest	scepticism	we	shall	eliminate	sophistry,	
illusion	and	superstition	while	affirming	what	we	may	properly	affirm	
given	 the	 limitations	 of	 our	 powers	 of	 understanding.	 Describing	
precisely	how	our	minds	actually	work,	how	our	beliefs	come	about,	
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will,	he	hopes,	give	us	reasons	to	determine	what	sorts	of	conclusions	
our	 intellectual	 capacities	 are	 fitted	 to	 reach.	We	 can	 see	 how	 this	
proposed	third	way	works	as	Hume	employs	it	in	one	of	the	several	
problematic	topics	to	which	he	returns.	Let’s	take	causation,	causality	
as	our	example.
When	we	say	A	causes	B,	we’re	aware	of	A	and	(then)	B;	but	what	
justifies	our	claiming	that	there	is	connection	between	A’s	occurrence	
and	(then)	B’s?	We	have	no	experienced	idea	of	a	link	between	A	and	B	
(so	there’s	even	a	question	of	what	we	can	mean	by	‘cause’).	So	far	as	
reason	goes,	any	event	of	its	kind	may	be	caused	so	far	as	reason	goes	
–	that	is	in	respect	of	whatever	can	be	deduced	from	the	very	natures	
of	 the	events	 involved	–	by	any	kind	of	event.	Reason,	scrutinizing	
the	 idea	of	 some	 thing	or	an	event	 in	 itself	 recognises	no	necessity	
that	it	can	be	caused	in	this	way,	or	that.	Further,	and	again	so	far	as	
reason	goes,	an	event	may	not	have	a	cause	at	all.	So	far	as	reason	(as	
it	scrutinizes	ideas)	goes,	the	very	idea	of	some	event	is	consistent	in	
reason	with	any	kind	of	cause,	or	none	whatever.	Ideas	are	distinct,	and	
there’s	nothing	in	the	idea,	say,	of	a	flame	that	necessitates	the	flame’s	
causing	heat	and	pain.	Nor,	so	far	as	its	idea	goes,	does	heat	have	to	
come	about	in	some	particular	way.	On	foundationalist	grounds,	it’s	
hard	to	see	how	beliefs	about	causal	connections	can	be	justified	when	
the	necessity	of	connections	between	ideas	is	lacking.	Hume’s	answer	
is	that	experience	leads	us	to	connect	causes	and	effects	according	to	
the	way	in	which	we	are	habituated	to	think,	habituated	by	experience	
of	ideas	found	together	in	certain	ways.	The	habitual	experience	of	the	
successions	of	ideas,	together	with	our	mind’s	tendency	to	associate	
ideas	thus	habitually	encountered,	gives	us	to	relate	causes	and	effects.	
We	put	in	the	connection	between	cause	and	effect.
Analogous	moves	 are	made	by	Hume	 to	 deal	with	 his	 range	of	
problems,	e.g.	over	belief	in	a	world	of	objects	external	to	our	minds	
and	 over	 belief	 in	 personal	 identity.	 The	 subjective	 quality	 of	 our	
experiences,	their	force	and	vivacity	(compared	with	mere	fantasizing	
or,	as	we	would	put	it,	 imagination)	will	serve	to	trigger	our	belief-
forming	 disposition	 so	 that	 we	 judge	 there	 to	 be	 physical	 objects	
affecting	us.	Again	the	contents	of	what	we	judge	to	be	our	mind	are	
held	together	in	what	we	are	aware	of	as	our	persisting	self	by	a	species	
of	 association	 of	 ideas.	 Hence,	 our	 beliefs	 in	 causal	 connections,	
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physical	 objects	 and	 in	 our	 ‘selves’	 are	 generated	 by	 the	ways	 our	
minds	deal	with	ideas	which	they	come	to	have.	Our	minds	function	
in	those	ways,	and	we	cannot	help	but	believe	in	these	ways.
Hume	goes	on	to	maintain	that,	given	this	third	way,	there	remain	
sceptical	 implications	 for	 some	 areas	 of	 supposed	 knowledge,	 or	
supposedly	 justifiable	belief.	Notably,	given	Hume’s	account	of	our	
minds’	workings,	knowledge	or	well-grounded	beliefs	about	God	or	the	
world	to	come	are	beyond	us.	Returning	to	arguments	employing	the	
concept	of	causation,	as	these	are	advanced	to	establish	the	existence	
of	God,	Hume	points	out	that	on	his	account	we	can	form	beliefs	about	
what	 causes	what	 (or	what	will	 be	 causes	what)	 only	 on	 the	 basis	
of,	 as	a	consequence	of,	 relevant	experience.	Recall	 the	analysis	of	
causal	judgements	to	the	effect	that	experience,	habitual	experience,	
is	formative	and	needed	for	us	to	arrive	at	causal	conclusions.	Hume’s	
well-known	objections	to	causal	arguments	for	God’s	existence	(like	
the	‘first	cause’	argument)	are	to	the	effect	that	we	lack	the	necessary	
relevant	experience	of	causal	connections	where	God	is	experienced	
as	 a	 cause.	 The	 Humean	 critique	 of	 design	 arguments	 makes	 an	
analogous	point:	we	have	insufficient	relevant	experience,	of	worlds	
being	 caused,	 to	 have	 a	 properly	 founded	view	on	 the	matter;	 and,	
Hume	 tells	 us,	 such	distantly	 relevant	 experience	 as	we	do	have	 is	
more	varied	in	its	guidance	than	to	justify	a	robust	theistic	conclusion.
Reid’s response
What	does	Thomas	Reid	make	of	Hume’s	reasonings?	First,	he	rejects	
the	‘Way	of	Ideas’,	which	holds	ideas	to	be	the	only	immediate	objects	
of	experience,	awareness	or	thought.	Hume	does	belong	squarely	in	
the	Way	of	Ideas	tradition	re-vivified	by	Descartes	(but	going	much	
further	 back).	 Reid	 sees	 this	 starting	 point	 as	 inevitably	 leading	 to	
scepticism,	 first	 about	 the	 character,	 and	 even	 the	 existence,	 of	 the	
material	 world	 beyond,	 and	 independent	 of,	 our	 minds.	 Then	 also	
scepticism	about	the	past	follows	at	once	from	adoption	of	the	Way	of	
Ideas	–	the	Ideal	(in	one	sense	anyway)	Philosophy.	But	why	on	earth	
adopt	this	starting	point	as	just	obviously	appropriate?	Reid	says	this	
about	Descartes,	the	giver	of	new	momentum	along	the	Way	of	Ideas:	
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It	might	have	been	expected,	 that	a	Philosopher	who	was	so	
cautious	as	not	to	take	his	own	existence	for	granted,	without	
proof,	would	not	have	taken	it	for	granted,	without	proof,	that	
every	thing	he	perceived	was	only	ideas	in	his	own	mind.7	
Why	did	people	step	out	on	the	Way	of	Ideas	so	readily,	uncritically,	
and	with	dire	consequences?	Partly	it	has	been	because	of	a	common	
manner	of	speech.	 Instead	of	saying	 that	John	 is	 thinking	about	his	
house	or	perhaps	that	he	wants	to	improve	it,	it’s	said	‘John	has	an	idea	
of	his	house’;	‘Jane	saw	the	tumbler’	can	be	expressed	as	‘Jane	had	a	
view	(or	a	glimpse)	of	the	tumbler’.	So	to	have	an	idea	of	something	
is	not	merely,	as	it	should	be,	engaging	in	an	operation	of	the	mind;	
it	becomes	having	a	 thing	 there	 in	 the	mind.	 ‘Having	something	 in	
the	mind’	 is	now	being	 taken	quite	 literally.	 In	 such	ways,	 ideas	or	
glimpses	come	to	be	treated	as	entities.	But	the	use	of	the	noun	‘idea’	
misleads	us	if	it	inclines	us	to	think	that	when	John	is	simply	thinking	
about	the	actual	house	there	are	then	three	things:	(i)	John;	(ii)	an	idea;	
(iii)	John’s	house.
Of	course,	the	Way	of	Ideas	philosophers	have	offered	arguments	
for	this	approach,	and	Reid	confronts	these.	There	is	an	argument	from	
the	relativity	of	perception.	It	goes	like	this:	what	I	see	when	I	look	at	
a	10p	coin	directly	from	above	is	round;	what	I	see	from	an	angle,	as	
I	move	to	one	side	is	elliptical;	and	thirdly,	what	I	see	with	my	eyes	
level	with	 the	 coin	when	only	 the	 edge	 is	 visible,	 is	 a	 short,	 thick,	
line.	But	 the	coin	 is	not	all	of	 these,	 round,	elliptical	and	 linear.	So	
that	which	I	see	in	each	of	these	cases	is	not	the	coin.	What	I	see	is	
something	in	the	mind.
But	Reid	asks:	Why	not	say	I	am	seeing	the	coin	each	time	but	that	
it	looks	different	from	different	angles?	By	such	reasonings	(there	are	
several	arguments)	Reid	rejects	the	Way	of	Ideas	and	asserts	that	when	
we	see	things,	like	apples	or	tables,	usually	we	see	them	directly:	we	
do	see	apples	and	tables	rather	than	ideas	or	images	of	them	(leaving	
aside	photographic	images,	drawings	or	mirror	images).
Then,	 further,	 he	 complains	 that	 Hume’s	 foundationalism	
(inherited,	as	we	saw)	is	arbitrary	in	accepting	two,	and	only	these,	
sorts	of	belief-formation	as	being	trustworthy.	For	any	belief	of	ours	to	
be	rational	on	Hume’s	view	they	have	to	be	prompted	and	generated	by	
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either	or	both	of	these	belief-forming	processes	or	quasi-mechanisms:	
introspection	and	intuition.	Reid	asks:	Why	favour	these	two	modes	
of	belief-production	while	rejecting	others	such	as	our	beliefs	about	
mind-independent	physical	things	as	seen	by	us,	or	our	beliefs	about	
past	 events	which	we	 remember,	or	our	beliefs	 in	causal	 links	–	as	
well	as	the	several	other	sorts	of	belief-producing	disposition	whose	
dubiousness	in	Hume’s	eyes	gives	rise	to	scepticism	about	them	and	
the	 beliefs	 they	 generate?	 The	 favour	 shown,	 to	 these	 two	 modes	
only,	seems	arbitrary.	The	Humean	sceptic	says	that	we	need	to	find	
a	reason	to	trust,	say	perception	and/or	memory,	before	we	accept	the	
beliefs	they	generate,	but	that	we	can	and	should	accept	introspection	
and	intuition	without	any	need	for	validation.	However,	Reid	points	
out,	there	has	not	been	shown	to	be	any	relevant	difference	between	
the	 favoured,	 trusted	ways	 to	belief	and	 those	which	are	held	 to	be	
unreliable,	 standing	 in	 need	 of	 vindication,	 justly	 under	 suspicion.	
Consider	introspection:	I	can	easily	get	wrong	what	I	seem	to	be	aware	
of	 by	 inattention,	 perhaps	 by	 having	my	 expectations	 about	what	 I	
should	be	seeing	so	strongly	misdirected	by	what	I	have	been	told	that	
I	mis-see.	 Intuition,	 rational	 awareness	 can	 similarly	prove	 fallible:	
when	we	rely	on	rational	intuitive	powers	rather	than	calculators	to	do	
arithmetic	we	can	get	the	answer	wrong;	and	philosophers’	paradoxes	
raise	grounds	for	lack	of	trust	in	our	‘rational’	intuitions.	Infallibility	
does	 not	 characterise	 and	 so	 does	 not	 mark	 off	 introspection	 or	
intuition	 from	 our	 other	 belief-forming	 mechanisms	 as	 distinctly	
wholly	reliable.
Reid’s	contention,	then,	is	that	as	we	humans	are	constituted	we	
find	 ourselves	 with	 belief-forming	 dispositions.	 None	 of	 these	 is	
infallible;	but	there	is	a	presumption	in	their	favour	such	that	unless	
we	 have	 some	 reason	 to	 suspect	 that	 they	may	 have	misled	 us,	 or	
that	 we	 have	 been	 careless	 in	 our	 use	 of	 them,	 we	 should	 accept	
beliefs	formed	by	them.	So	we	may	have	formed	false	beliefs	due	to	
inattention,	or	 the	 influence	of	other	people	as	suggested	above.	Or	
again,	if	the	conditions	in	which	they’re	used	are	inappropriate	(poor	
light	may	undermine	the	worth	of	perceptual	beliefs),	we	may	have	
reason	to	doubt	our	powers	of	vision.	Lacking	such	reasons	for	doubt,	
we	 should	 exercise	 a	 presumption	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 belief-forming	
mechanisms	with	which	we’re	endowed.
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It	isn’t,	on	Reid’s	view,	that	we	can	provide	evidence	or	grounds	for	
trusting	in	the	reliability	of	any	of	these	belief-forming	dispositions.	
If	we	try	to	do	that	the	effort	will	turn	out	to	be	futilely	circular.	Take	
an	example,	 say	memory.	 If	we	wish	 to	establish	 the	credentials	of	
the	 memory-belief-forming	 disposition,	 how	 can	 we	 check	 out	 its	
reliability?	We	can	only	check	out	the	correctness	of	some	memory	by	
appealing	to	other	memories.	If	we	wonder	whether	we	misbehaved	
at	Avril’s	 birthday	 party	 at	 Crieff	 we	 might	 check	 a	 diary	 or	 ask	
someone	who	was	there.	But	we	have	to	remember	that	we	wrote	a	
diary	entry,	 that	 this	 is	our	diary,	 that	someone	else	was	 there	 then,	
and	that	their	memory	is	trustworthy.	The	same	sort	of	circularity	is	
inevitable	whenever	we	might	try	to	check	the	trustworthiness	of	our	
other	 belief-forming	 dispositions.	 So,	 take	 perception:	 Suppose	we	
call	into	question	the	accuracy	of	our	perception	that	that	which	we	
see	is	a	statue	of	a	man	with	a	top	hat,	how	can	we	check	this	matter	
out	without	using	and	in	some	way	relying	upon	perception?	We	can’t.	
Reid	points	out	that	there	is	no	non-circular	justification	for	each	of	
the	modes	of	belief-formation.
Corresponding	 to	 these	 modes	 of	 belief-formation	 are	 what	
Reid	calls	‘Principles’.	Variously,	these	are	the	‘Principles	taken	for	
granted’,	 ‘First	 Principles’,	 or	 ‘Principles	 of	 Common	 Sense’,	 and	
they	each	register	 trust	 in	one	of	our	belief-forming	practices.	They	
are	 Principles	 descriptive	 of	 our	 cognitive	 constitution.	 They	 have	
three	marks:
(i)	 they	are	universal	among	humankind	–	apart	 from	 lunatics	
and	excessively	sceptical	philosophers;
(ii)	 they	are	not	grounded	in	any	reasoning	and	they	cannot	be	
supported	in	such	ways;
(iii)	 they	are	part	of	the	constitution	of	the	mind	itself;	consequently	
no-one	can	sustain	resistance	against	them.
Principles	 of	 this	 sort	 speak	 of:	 our	 capacity	 to	 perceive	 objects	 in	
an	independently	(of	our	minds)	existing	world;	of	our	remembering	
actual	 occurrences;	 that	we	 converse	with	 others	 of	 our	 fellows	 in	
whom	are	life	and	intelligence;	that	in	the	course	of	nature	what	will	
be	will	probably	resemble	what	has	been	in	similar	circumstances.
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Several	 modern	 Christian	 apologists	 have	 taken	 up	 Reid’s	
treatment	of	our	human	situation	in	matters	cognitive,	and	have	made	
use	 of	 his	 conception	 of	 distinct	 belief-forming	 dispositions	whose	
reliability	cannot	be	non-circularly	assessed	or	established.
William	 Alston’s	 book	 on	 ordinary	 sense	 perception8	 offers	
a	 Reidian	 case	 in	 that	 field,	 while	 his	 much	 fuller	 Perceiving 
God 9 maintains	that	we	have	(i.e.	have	been	given)	a	belief-forming	
disposition	 by	 which	 in	 appropriate	 circumstances	 we	 perceive	
(though	 not	with	 our	 eyes,	 particularly)	 God.	Alvin	 Plantinga	 and,	
perhaps	most	congenially	 to	Presbyterians,	Nicholas	Wolterstorff	of	
Yale,	 in	Divine Discourse10	 (where	 the	 imagery	of	God	who	speaks	
is	 central)	 have	 been	 advancing,	 with	 grateful	 acknowledgement	
to	 him,	 such	 Reid-inspired	 approaches	 to	 knowledge	 of	 God.
Alston	 maintains	 that	 a	 propensity	 to	 form	 beliefs	 about	 God,	
even	 specifically	Christian	beliefs,	 is	 a	mode	of	belief-formation,	 a	
disposition	which	is	activated	when	the	circumstances	are	right	–	i.e.	
when	we	have	certain	sorts	of	experience	in	appropriate	circumstances	
and	there	are	no	counter-considerations	(drugs,	madness,	etc.)	to	raise	
doubt	about	the	truth	of	the	belief	thus	formed.	Such	beliefs	will	be	
no	 less	defensible	and	respectable	 than	our	perceptual	beliefs	about	
the	physical	world,	or	our	memory	beliefs	about	the	remembered	past.
On	 the	 major	 topic	 of	 causation,	 Reid	 has	 important	 things	 to	
say	 which	 take	 their	 point	 of	 departure	 from	 Hume’s	 discussion	
of	 causation.	They	are	not	 (in	 the	way	of	much	of	what	he	 says)	 a	
countering	or	even	a	ridiculing	of	Hume.	With	regard	to	ridicule,	Reid	
had	said	 that	someone	who	really	does	believe	as	 the	philosophical	
sceptic	prescribes	 (i.e.	 that	maybe	 there	are	no	physical	objects,	no	
past,	no	sentient	me,	or	you)	is	actually	mad.	The	philosophical	sceptic	
himself	only	pretends	to	think	that	he	can	know	as	little	as	he	says	he	
can	know.	Reid	 says	 that	you	cannot	argue	with	 the	 thoroughgoing	
philosophical	sceptic	because	he	allows	no	firm	ground	for	anyone	to	
argue	from	–	but	you	can	ridicule	him.	And	any	person	who	really	does	
believe	the	sceptic’s	teaching	needs	treatment.	But	back	to	causation.
Reid	says	 that	we	acquire	 the	concept	of	one	 thing’s	having	 the	
power	 to	 affect	 another	 from	our	 experience	of	our	 exerting	power	
when	by	our	volition	and	deliberate	agency	we	bring	some	specific	
thing	 about.	 Merely	 inanimate	 material	 things	 cannot	 have	 power	
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to	bring	about	specific	effects.	Not	only	 is	he	making	a	point	about	
how	we	can	conceive	of	causal	power,	i.e.	as	involving	a	will,	but	he	
is	picking	up	Hume’s	celebrated	 insistence	 that	when	we	scrutinize	
what	we	are	aware	of	when	we	say	that	one	material	thing	(or	event	
involving	 material	 things)	 causes	 another,	 there	 is	 no	 idea	 of	 a	
necessary	connection	between	so-called	cause	and	 its	effect	–	 there	
is	no	idea	of	power	detectable	in	such	a	causing,	power	such	that	the	
effect	must	follow.	In	fact,	so	Reid	contends,	only	a	possessor	of	a	will	
can	be	conceived	of	by	us	as	having	causal	power.	The	only	experience	
we	have	of	power’s	exertion	and	application	is	in	our	bringing	things	
about	 by	 the	 exertion	 of	 our	will.	That	 is	where	 our	 conception	 of	
power	comes	from,	where	it	can	only	come	from.
Now,	most	 changes	 in	 the	 world	 are	 not	 brought	 about	 by	 our	
exerting	our	will.	We	have	to	attribute	most	of	the	power	which	effects	
physical	 change	 in	 the	 world	 to	 God.	 Causal	 connections	 require	
power	 effectively	 directed	 towards	 a	 specific	 outcome	 (which	 we	
incline	to	see	as	necessitated).	At	this	point,	God	enters	explicitly	and	
essentially	(as	Reid	sees	it)	into	Reid’s	system.	But	to	say	only	that	
about	God’s	role	in	Reid	would	be	to	leave	out	what	Wolterstorff	(who	
is	probably	Reid’s	most	penetrating	and	appreciative	advocate)	calls	
Reid’s	‘epistemological	piety’.	What’s	in	mind	here	is	that	our	human	
situation	in	respect	of	our	possession	of	knowledge	has	been	revealed	
by	 Reid	 as	 one	 calling	 for	 humility,	 gratitude	 and	 trust.	 Humility	
because	we	know	so	 little	 about	how	our	mind	gains	 its	 awareness	
of	 the	world	 of	 objects:	 the	 objects	 themselves	 do	 not	 act	 upon	 us	
(lacking	power	as	they	do).	That	ignorance	is	a	particular	sort	of	case	
of	 the	general	 ignorance	as	 to	why	when	one	sort	of	 thing	happens	
another	specific	sort	of	thing	generally	follows	in	accordance	with	a	
recurring	pattern.	Why	that	pattern,	and	perhaps	why	any	pattern?	An	
explanation	of	sorts	 in	 terms	of	God’s	power	and	benevolence	may	
help	with	the	latter	question	–	why	any	pattern	at	all?	Why	not	a	chaos	
rather	than	a	cosmos?
Applying	 the	 above	 to	 belief	 formation:	 we	 do	 not	 understand	
in	any	deeper	ways	than	noting	recurring	patterns	why	in	particular	
our	 belief-forming	mechanisms	–	 those	 causal	 events	 –	 are	 as	 they	
are.	Nor	do	we	understand	why	we	have	these	(so	we	have	memory	
which	gives	us	access	to	beliefs	about	the	past:	why	do	we	not	have	
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a	capacity	to	form	beliefs	about	the	future?).	Humility	is	proper	for	
those	philosophers	who	have	 thought	 they	could	base	all	beliefs	on	
introspection	and	 intuition.	But	 these	 (foundationalist)	philosophers	
cannot	 justify	 their	 believing	 in	 any	 such	 way.	 They	 must	 trust,	
like	 everyone	 else.	 Gratitude	 is	 called	 for	 because	 our	 belief-
forming	 dispositions	 or	 ‘mechanisms’	 are	 generally	 reliable	 when	
appropriately	employed.	We	can	 trust	 them.	All	of	us,	philosophers	
specially	included,	have	to	trust	our	belief-forming	dispositions.	That	
is	a	thumbnail	sketch	of	epistemological	piety.
What	is	the	relevance	of	this	‘epistemological	piety’	to	apologetics	
understood	 as	 giving	 reasons	 for	 belief	 in	 God?	 Reid	 clearly	 is	 a	
believer	in	God;	but	he	is	not	in	the	writings	we’ve	considered	offering	
arguments	whose	main	aim	is	to	give	reasons	for	believing	that	there	
is	a	God.	Nor	does	he	address	Hume’s	arguments	specifically	against	
‘superstition’.
Still,	 doesn’t	what	we’ve	 just	 seen	 about	 the	 appropriateness	of	
the	Judaeo-Christian	teaching,	which	otherwise	commends	humility,	
gratitude	 and	 trust,	 to	 what	 we	 have	 discovered	 of	 our	 epistemic	
situation	–	doesn’t	 this	 constitute	a	modest	measure	of	 support	 and	
maybe	confirmation	for	Judaeo-Christianity?	What	I	have	in	mind	is	
this:	Judaeo-Christianity	strongly	commends	humility,	gratitude	and	
trust	 supposedly	 by	 plain	 injunction,	 and	 as	 implications	 of	 other	
things	God	is,	or	has	said	or	done,	or	maybe	both	these	ways	(straight	
commands,	and	in	response	to	God’s	salvific	action).	That	being	so,	
if	we	now	find	that	our	environment	and	our	relation	to	it	through	our	
cognitive	 endowments	 call	 for	 these	virtues,	 does	 that	 not	 count	 as	
a	kind	of	support	(far	short	of	clinching	proof)	for	Judaeo-Christian	
teaching?
Then	what	Reid	says	about	power	may,	most	easily	of	the	Reidian	
ideas	we’ve	 touched	upon,	be	 transposed	 into	a	reason	for	belief	 in	
God.	The	argument	would	go	like	this:	we	acquire	the	idea	from	our	
own	experience	of	intentionally	bringing	things	about.	It	is	common	
ground	between	Reid	and	Hume	 that	when	we	are	 acquainted	with	
what	we	reckon	to	be	causal	connections	(as	contrasted	with	merely	
coincidental	 sequences	 of	 events)	we	 have	 no	 awareness,	 no	 ‘idea’	
of	anything	other	than	that	one	kind	of	event	follows	another.	Hume	
seems	to	hold,	roughly,	that	our	concept	of	a	cause	requires	only	the	
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facts:	(i)	of	the	sequence	of	events	conforming	to	a	common	pattern	
in	experience;	and	(ii)	our	having	become	habituated	 to,	or	by,	 that	
recurring	sequence	so	as	to	expect	it.	(Some	recent	scholars	suggest	
that	 Hume	 thought	 that	 there	may	well	 be	 a	 connection,	 but	 quite	
unknown	to	us,	between	a	cause	and	its	effect.)
Reid	apparently	says	 that	 there	 is	 surely	more	 than	expectation-
creating	 recurrence	 in	 causation:	 power	 to	 secure	 the	 effect	 is	
employed.	And	the	only	power	of	which	we	have	acquired	a	relevant	
concept	 is	 the	power	of	 an	agent;	 and	a	god	 is	 the	only	agent	who	
could	have	the	required	power	or	powers	in	causal	process.	Perhaps,	
cautiously,	Reid	may	be	ready	to	say	only	that	while	power	at	work	
in	 causal	 transactions	 remains	 a	 mystery,	 God	 would	 constitute	 a	
possible	explanation.	There	could	be	a	debate	over	whether	appealing	
to	 a	god’s	power	as	offering	a	possible	 explanation	of	what	 cannot	
otherwise	 be	 explained	 counts	 as	 a	 good	 reason	 to	 believe	 in	God.	
Perhaps,	as	Robert	Adams	says	in	another	connection,	‘it	is	a	theoretical	
advantage	of	theistic	belief	that	it	provides	attractive	explanations	of	
things	otherwise	hard	to	explain’.11
Reid	did	believe	 in	a	causal	argument	 for	 the	existence	of	God,	
depending	 rather	 on	 the	 need	 for	 some	 causal	 explanation	 of	 the	
world’s	existence	than	on	anyone’s	experience	of	worlds	having	been	
preceded	by	a	god’s	action.	Accordingly	the	part	of	Hume’s	critique	of	
causal	arguments	for	theism	which	will	affect	Reid’s	view	is	Hume’s	
contentions	 that	we	can	 suppose	an	event	or	object	 to	have	had	no	
cause	at	all,	and	do	not	require	 to	propose	any	cause	for	 the	world.	
Reid	can	reply	that	what	we	can	suppose	or	imagine	may	not	be	what	
our	belief-forming	powers	lead	us	to	believe.	We	can	imagine	fairy-
godmothers	 turning	 mice	 into	 horses,	 after	 all.	We	 do	 not	 believe	
that	 there	 are	 or	 have	 been	 causeless	 events.	 If	 our	 belief-forming	
dispositions	 in	respect	of	causation	are	 to	be	 trusted	along	with	our	
belief-forming	powers	which	 conform	 to	 standards	 required	 for	 the	
Principles	 of	 Common	 Sense,	 then	 a	 causal	 argument	 for	God	 has	
value.
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